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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher Michael Foote appeals from his judgment of conviction for
possession of methamphetamine, arguing that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The facts, as found by the district court, are as follows:
On February 13th of 2012, in Bingham County, Idaho, dispatch was
advised by a landlord who's been identified as Mr. Ely that he was
concerned with a tenant and a disturbance going on in the apartment, and
he was concerned, apparently, about something happening to the
apartment.
Dispatch contacts Officer Adrignola, who responds with Officer
lnfanger and Corporal Wheatley. At least they arrive at approximately the
same time, and they make contact with the landlord, Mr. Ely. And Mr. Ely
takes them into his home and directs them to where the defendant's
apartment is. And in doing so, he takes them through his house, the
landlord's house, through the kitchen, which has a door that adjoins the
stairwell and the garage, described in Exhibit A submitted here today.
In looking at Exhibit A, looking at that document, the defendant has
outlined a rectangular home, outlined his apartment which is upstairs, has
drawn on there what appears to be a sidewalk to a door on the right side
of that diagram and towards the bottom of that diagram in the right-hand
corner. He indicates that that's a door that people come to when they
come to visit him and that it remains locked.
However, the garage is Mr. Ely's, which connects to the stairwell,
which connects to the kitchen, which the defendant explained was to the
left of that stairwell, being the kitchen of the landlord.
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This Court finds that that area is basically a common area. At least
it belongs to Mr. Ely, and he has the authority to allow people into that
area.
When you go up the stairs, then there's a makeshift door.
This Court finds that the officers did, after being shown where the
apartment was, go up those stairs and knocked on the door, and the
defendant opened the door at that point.
The officers, in getting there, were checking and investigating the
disturbance. The officer indicated they were doing a welfare check. And
they indicated that, when they knocked on the door, that contact-initial
contact was very short. They asked the defendant to come downstairs.
During that short period of time, the officer did note the defendant looked a
little disheveled, was disoriented, and was sweating.
When they asked him to come downstairs, rather than coming
downstairs, he put his hand in his pocket and turned back into the
apartment.
There's no indication, other than the defendant's own
testimony, that he went outside that apartment door at the top of those
stairs.
In fact, he says, when the officers got there, he was coming down
the stairs. And, quite frankly, this Court thinks that's-puts more weight
on the officer's testimony. I think it's more credible in this case.
But at the same time, I think that even makes a stronger position for
the initial question, when this defendant remains upstairs in his apartment,
never steps out, turns around, putting his hand in his pocket, and going
back into-or deeper into his apartment.
The officer, being concerned for his safety based upon that
movement of putting his hand in his pocket, follows him in. And within a
short distance the defendant removes a pipe and puts it into the drawer.
The officer observes that pipe and knows, from his training and
experience, that it is a marijuana pipe and sees a lightbulb [sic] within the
dresser drawer as well consistent with one used for smoking
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methamphetamine. The defendant closes the drawer, at which the officer
promptly opens the drawer and places those on top of the dresser.
They then place Mr. Foote in a chair and then begin to question
him. After a certain point in time, he gives them consent to search the rest
of the apartment.
(5/16/2012 Tr., p.68, L.6 - p.71, L.7.)
The state charged Foote with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.57-58.)
Foote moved to suppress the evidence found in his apartment, asserting that officers
violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the apartment "without consent, probable
cause, or a warrant." (R., pp.78-79.) The district court held a hearing on the motion
(5/16/2012 Tr.; see also R., pp.109-10), and after taking the matter under advisement,
subsequently denied the suppression motion (5/18/2012 Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.13;
see also R., p.112).
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, wherein Foote reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his suppression motion, Foote pleaded guilty. (See R., pp.183-84,
207.)

The district court entered judgment against Foote and imposed a suspended

sentence of six years with two years fixed, and placed Foote on probation for a period of
five years. (R., pp.231-33.) Foote filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.237-38.)
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ISSUE
Foote states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Foote's motion to suppress
and finding that law enforcement's warrantless intrusion into Mr. Foote's
apartment was justified?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Foote failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence?
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ARGUMENT
Foote Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Below, Foote filed a motion to suppress evidence found in his apartment arguing

that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his apartment "without
consent, probable cause, or a warrant." (R., pp.78-79.) The district court denied the
motion, holding that the officers' entry was justified by the exigent circumstances of
officer safety and protecting Foote from himself. (5/18/2012 Tr., p.12, L.19- p.13, L.13;
see also R., p.112.) On appeal, Foote argues that the district court's ruling was in error.
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-12.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this
case, however, supports the district court's order.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86,
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286
(Ct. App. 1996).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of

witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P .2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
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Exigent Circumstances Justified The Warrantless Entry Into Foote's Apartment

C.

The issue in this case was whether the circumstances officers encountered
justified their warrantless entry into Foote's apartment. The Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV. An officer's warrantless entry into a residence is presumptively
unreasonable unless it falls within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 218 (Ct. App. 2003);
State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 849, 41 P.3d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
One such exception occurs when the "exigencies of the situation" make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394
(1978).

Under this exigent circumstances exception, "a warrantless intrusion may be

justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other
persons inside or outside the dwelling." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)
(internal citation and quotation omitted).

A court evaluating a claim that exigent

circumstances justified a warrantless home entry should determine whether the facts
known to the police, with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, would "warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate.
Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278.
The reasonableness of the belief that an exigency exists is determined by the
totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of the entry.
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State v.

Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 711, 662 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Ct. App. 1983). While courts
must scrutinize a claim of emergency to ensure that it is not a mere pretext for entries
and searches that otherwise would require a warrant, courts should avoid secondguessing police decisions made in legitimate belief that life may very well be at stake.
Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278. "The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Therefore, reasonableness "must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight."

kl

The district court determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the
officers' entrance into Foote's apartment was justified by their reasonable belief that the
situation they faced with Foote created the exigencies of protecting themselves and
others, and protecting Foote from himself.

(5/18/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.19-25.)

The

underlying facts of this case involved the officers responding to an unknown situation,
intending to perform a welfare check due to Foote's out of control behavior. (5/16/2012
Tr., p.10, Ls.12-19; p.69, Ls.18-20.) Foote had been tearing apart his apartment and
yelling about missing some medication, causing concern to his landlord, Mr. Ely.
(5/16/2012 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-15.) Police made contact with Foote at "a little after midnight."
(5/16/2012 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.9.) Foote looked disoriented, was "sweating quite a
bit," and appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (5/16/2012 Tr., p.13,
Ls.6-9; p.26, L.15 - p.27, L.2.) Foote would not come out of the apartment to speak to
the police. (5/16/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-24.) Instead Foote made a "furtive" movement
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by grabbing his pocket, told the officers to "hold on a second," and, leaving the door
open, retreated deeper into the apartment.

(5/16/2012 Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.1;

5/18/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-3.)
The district court determined that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Ryburn v. Huff,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 987 (2012), presented an analogous case. In
that case, officers learned of a rumor that a student had threatened to "shoot up" his
school.

kL. at_,

132 S.Ct. at 988. The officers decided to investigate the threat by

contacting the student at his house.

kL.

After officers knocked on the door without

response and called home and cell phone numbers, the student ultimately came outside
with his mother to talk to the police.
indoors, but the mother refused.
there were guns in the house.

kL.

The officers wanted to discuss the matter

kL. at_,

kL. at_,

132 S.Ct. at 988-89. The officers asked if

132 S.Ct. at 989. The mother responded by

immediately turning around and running into the house.
safety, the officers followed.

!st Concerned for officer

kL.

The Supreme Court recognized that its jurisprudence reasonably led to the
conclusion that "the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a residence if the
officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an imminent threat of
violence."

kL.

at_, 132 S.Ct. at 990. The district court in Ryburn, based on the

totality of the circumstances the officers confronted, determined that the officers had an
objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was a threat of imminent violence,
"particularly since the situation was 'rapidly evolving,' and the officers had to make quick
decisions."

!st at_, 132 S.Ct. at 990-91. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed

believing, "[w]ith the benefit of hindsight and calm deliberation," that the officers' fears

8

were unreasonable because the subjects had only asserted their constitutional rights to
not speak with the police by retreating into their home.

lsL at_, 132 S.Ct. at 991.

The Supreme Court reversed the panel, holding that, "[j]udged from the proper
perspective of a reasonable officer forced to make a split-second decision in response
to a rapidly unfolding chain of events that culminated with [the mother] running into the
house after refusing to answer a question about guns, [the officers'] belief that entry was
necessary to avoid injury to themselves or others was imminently reasonable."

!st at

, 132 S.Ct. at 992.
Under the circumstances of this case, judged at the moment of entry, officers
could reasonably believe that following Foote into the apartment was the course of
action best calculated to protect officers and others nearby. The situation was tense,
with officers responding to an unknown threat late at night. Foote would not come out
and speak to the officers. He appeared to be under the influence of drugs. He was
behaving out of control, tearing apart his apartment and causing concern to his landlord,
Mr. Ely. Under these circumstances, Foote's furtive movement of grabbing his pocket
could reasonably be interpreted as Foote reaching for a weapon.

Foote's retreat

deeper into his apartment could lead an officer to reasonably infer, in that split-second,
that whatever weapon Foote sought, he had not found it in his pocket. Following Foote
into the apartment, in an effort to prevent him from acquiring a weapon, much like in
Ryburn, furthers the interest of protecting the police and others nearby.

This is

especially true when confronting a subject who appears under the influence and was
behaving out of control. On the contrary, requiring officers to wait for a violent subject to
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arm himself before they can take precautionary measures, in order to protect
themselves and others nearby, does nothing to further the interest of officer safety.
The exigent circumstance of protecting Foote from himself is also supported by
applicable case law and the facts found by the district court. In this case, officers were
not investigating criminal activity; they were responding to a disturbance, attempting to
perform a welfare check, due to Foote's behavior. Foote was obviously distraught and
out of control, tearing apart his apartment and yelling about his missing medication. He
appeared disoriented, disheveled, and under the influence. Foote would not come out
of his apartment to speak with the police, instead retreating deeper into his apartment
after grabbing his pocket.

Under the totality of these circumstances, it would be

reasonable to believe that Foote either needed assistance locating his medications 1 or
that he presented a risk to himself and, if not followed, might harm himself. Forced to
make a split-second decision in that tense situation, and based on the exigency of
protecting Foote from himself or at least rendering assistance, officers could reasonably
conclude that an exigency existed that required them to enter Foote's apartment without
a warrant.
Though the district court did not employ it as grounds to justify the officers'
warrantless entry into Foote's apartment, another possible exigency existed in this case:
Protecting Mr. Ely's property, the apartment, from further destruction by Foote. 2 In the
case of New York v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976), the Court of Appeals of New
1

Reviewing Foote's testimony, it appears that the officers actually found his missing
medications. (See 5/16/2013 Tr., p.43, Ls.6-11.)
2

Appellate courts will affirm an ultimately correct ruling made on an incorrect legal
analysis by applying the correct legal analysis. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21
P.3d 895, 901 (2001).
10

York held that the exigent circumstance exception applies where police have
reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency requires their immediate assistance
for the protection of life or property.

kl at 609 (abrogated on other grounds by Brigham

City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006)).
expanded exception.

Other jurisdictions have adopted this

See, ~ . Massachusetts v. Knowles, 883 N.E.2d 941, 946

(Mass. 2008) (the emergency exception applies when the police are responding to an
immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property); New Mexico v.
Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1044 (N.M. 2005).

This exception is "closely related to the

community caretaking function" and, as with that function, "does not apply when the
purpose of police action is to gather evidence of criminal activity, rather than to respond
to an immediate need for protection of life or property." Knowles, 883 N.E.2d at 946.
Idaho appellate courts have also recognized that police officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment by taking action consistent with their community caretaking function.
In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 818, 748 P.2d 401, 402 (1988).

"The constitutional

standard in community caretaking function cases is whether intrusive action of police
was reasonable in view of all surrounding circumstances." State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho
752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (quotation and brackets omitted). "An action is
'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of
mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action." Brigham City
at 404 (emphasis original, quotations and brackets omitted). The officer's subjective
motive is irrelevant. Id.
Under the facts of this case, entry into the apartment was objectively reasonable
based on the exigency of protecting Mr. Ely's property. Foote was out of control, tearing
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apart the apartment. Officers were called to the scene because Mr. Ely, who owned the
apartment, was concerned based on Foote's behavior that something might happen to
his property, the apartment. The officers were investigating the public disturbance, not
investigating a crime.

Entering the apartment to prevent further destruction to the

property is reasonable under those circumstances, regardless of the officers' subjective
motive for the warrantless entry.
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, making split-second
decisions while confronting Foote, who had been tearing apart an apartment while
yelling about missing medication, and who appeared to be under the influence of drugs,
in a tense and evolving situation, officers could reasonably conclude that entering
Foote's apartment without a warrant was necessary for officer safety, to protect Foote
from himself, or to protect Mr. Ely's property. Because the officers' entry into Foote's
apartment was justified by exigency, the district court correctly denied Foote's
suppression motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Foote's motion to suppress evidence.

DATED this 3rd day of October, 2013.

c~
R ~
Deputy Attorney General
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